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European Central Bank Working Paper Series  70Abstract
In this paper we propose an extension to New International Macroeconomic
framework by introducing the vertical investment margin. The dynamic proper-
ties of the extended model are discussed in relation to relevant existing models with
particular emphasis on the impact of productivity convergence and eﬀects of timing
of trade and ﬁnancial liberalization on the convergence patterns. We compare the
mechanisms behind the three investment margins (horizontal investment to new
varieties, vertical investment to quality, and investment to export-eligibility) for
the long-run equilibrium. Based on such comparison, the proposed extension proves
crucial for consistent explanation of long-term trends in macroeconomic aggregates
and the real exchange rate development observed in European transition countries.
Key words: Two-country modeling, Convergence, New International
Macroeconomics
J.E.L. Classiﬁcation: F12, F36, F41.
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August 2007Non-Technical Summary
This paper analyzes the potential of two-country dynamic general equilib-
rium modeling initiated by the so-called New International Macroeconomic
framework for understanding the convergence processes of emerging market
economies. The emphasis is put on long-run trends of the main macroeconomic
variables and on the development of the real exchange rate. In particular, pro-
posed explanation of the real exchange rate pattern is an innovative aspect
of the paper since the pace of the real exchange rate appreciation, experi-
enced by some central and eastern European countries, remains unaddressed
in standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models.
The New International Macroeconomic framework is characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition, heterogeneity of production entities and microfounded
tradeness self-selectiveness. The paper shows that, under suitable extensions
of the canonical structure of New International Macroeconomic models, it is
possible to explain the long-run development of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables together with alternative real exchange rate developments depending on
the the type of convergence as recently experienced by transition economies.
In this respect, the crucial extension is the introduction of two endogenous di-
mensions of investments: horizontal (number of varieties) and vertical (quality
investment as in quality ladder literature).
The extended model is then adapted to the framework of countries, which
are asymmetric in size and in the total factor productivity. First, we inquire
on the steady-state impact of an increase in the total factor productivity
(TFP) on the real exchange rate and terms-of-trade. We document that the
three margins (horizontal, vertical, and export-eligibility) can generate the real
exchange rate appreciation after a TFP increase and discuss how the channels
behind the three margins diﬀer.
Then we use numerical simulation of the transition dynamics to investigate
intertemporal mechanisms implied by the three investment margins. The simu-
lations reveal that the vertical margin reduces consumption smoothing. More-
over, under the realistic calibration of the model, without the vertical invest-
ments it is impossible to generate the real-exchange rate appreciation observed
in selected Central European transition countries. We further provide a dis-
cussion about the implications of diﬀerent assumptions on the productivity
of multinational ﬁrms and show what is needed to obtain a realistic pattern
of the ﬁnancial and current account patterns of transition countries. And ﬁ-
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The purpose of this paper is to introduce an extension to the existing two-
country dynamic general equilibrium models with NIM features for under-
standing the convergence process of emerging market economies and provide
an extensive discussion on model properties. This is of special interest, since
macroeconomic dynamics of transition economies is even more puzzling from
the perspective of standard DSGE models than that of advanced economies.
The following ﬁve facts dominate the picture of the economic development
in transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe (so called Visegrad-
4 countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) during a
transition decade 1995-2005, i.e. after the basic institutional foundations of a
market economy has been created 1 :
Fact 1: The convergence in GDP per capita of an average Visegrad-4 country
to the average of the EU15 attained 1 per cent a year on average over the
decade.
Fact 2: Signiﬁcant trade integration has led to an increase in export to GDP
ratio on average over Visegrad-4 countries by 2 per cent a year over the
decade. And trade balance, after initial deﬁcit around 5 per cent, has reached
balanced position at the end of the decade.
Fact 3: The privatization and economic attractiveness of the region have re-
sulted in a signiﬁcant inﬂow of the foreign direct investment; on average the
inﬂow in Visegrad-4 countries reached 5 bln. USD a year over the decade.
The foreignly-owned ﬁrms have increased their share on the total exports
(in some countries even up to 90%).
Fact 4: Real exchange rates – also in sub-index of tradable goods – of Visegrad-
4 currencies vis ` a vis the Euro have been appreciating by an average of
slightly exceeding 2 per cent a year.
Fact 5: The proportion of medium-high and high tech products in total ex-
ports has gained 1.5 to 2 per cent a year, see Fabrizio et al (2006).
The ﬁve facts are demonstrated using Figure 1.
In order to consistently explain these facts one needs a quite sophisticated
1 The following applies to all Visegrad-4 countries: the EBRD index of price liber-
alization shows that all these countries have liberalized prices to the level 3 that is
comparable to advanced industrialized countries by 1993. Similarly, all these coun-
tries liberalized trade and foreign exchange until 1995 to the extent (level 4, EBRD
index) considered as standard for advanced industrialized countries. And ﬁnally, the
small as well as large scale privatization has been completed (level 4, EBRD index)
by 1995 and 1997, respectively. For more discussion on institutional foundation and
reforms implementation, see Roland (2004).
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of aggregate total factor productivity and export self-selectiveness to match
the structural changes observed in reality: an increasing foreign ownership of
companies, higher total factor productivity in companies under foreign con-
trol, increasing share of export facilitated by foreign owned companies, and
improvement in trade balance together with appreciating domestic currencies.
Some of the above mentioned mechanisms pertaining to the transition econ-
omy are also typical for the New International Macroeconomic (henceforth
NIM) framework, i.e., the monopolistic competition, heterogeneity of produc-
tion entities and trade self-selectiveness, as in Melitz (2003). These models
provide a rigorous microfoundation for a bulk of observations, which are puz-
zling from the perspective of the standard DSGE models (such as persistent
deviations from the PPP or low volatility in the relative price of nontraded
goods) 2 .
However, the concurrently observed Fact 2 and Fact 4 calls for an extension
of the available framework, since relatively more goods (Fact 2 and Fact 3) is
sold for relatively higher prices (Fact 4). This trend development in Visegrad-
4 countries can be only reconciled by a steady improvement in quality of
products (Fact 5). And since the canonical model of NIM operates with ho-
mogenous goods, is encounters obvious problems in explaining consistently all
the Facts stated above. This could be seen on rather isolated attempt by Bay-
oumi et al. (2004) to use the NIM framework to explain the macroeconomic
dynamics of transition countries. They construct a DSGE model with the NIM
features and calibrate it for a transition economy (the Czech Republic). How-
ever, their model does not address any speciﬁc transition feature and thus its
applicability for realistic convergence projections remains limited especially
because the model is not able to replicate the signiﬁcant observed pace of the
real exchange rate appreciation (i.e., Fact 4).
Therefore, in this paper we present an extension of the NIM framework, which
is essentially aimed at relaxing the homogeneity of products in the NIM mod-
els. Our model assumes that investments have two dimensions: investment into
new varieties and investment into quality, where the latter is an extension to
the canonical NIM structure. Both decisions are taken endogenously and, on
aggregate, inﬂuence real exchange rate and convergence dynamics. Such a
model can then provide a solid basis for policy assessment and transition dy-
namics projections (including conditional real exchange rate projections, see
Br˚ uha and Podpiera, 2007 for such conditional projections and policy impli-
2 The framework is used, for example, by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) to explain
international business-cycle dynamics, by Naknoi (2006) to decompose real exchange
rate movements, or by Bergin and Glick (2005) to study the behavior of price
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turing long-run trends in main macroeconomic variables of a converging econ-
omy. Thus, contrary to a usual practice of applied DSGE models, which at-
tempt to characterize the short-run ﬂuctuations around a steady state or
around an exogenously given development trajectory, the proposed model
yields a long-run trajectory of convergence of asymmetric countries – the coun-
tries diﬀer by total factor productivity (TFP) and size.
Since the stress is in long-run trends rather than short-run ﬂuctuations around
these trends, the model is formulated as a dynamic, perfect-foresight model.
The model lacks stochastics in aggregates since short run ﬂuctuations are
out of the scope: rather the model can provide guidance on how the pace of
productivity convergence and policy interventions (such as timing and degree
of trade and ﬁnancial liberalization) aﬀect the long-run convergence and what
are the implications for macroeconomic dynamics. The special interest is in the
pace of the real exchange rate appreciation and GDP per capita convergence.
This is of particular importance in relation to applied model to real data, as
provided by Br˚ uha and Podpiera (2007) or Br˚ uha, Podpiera and Pol´ ak (2007).
Since the proposed extension is a novel feature, model properties are carefully
investigated. Analytically only the symmetric steady state of the model can
be characterized. The analysis yields useful insights and enriches the NIM
literature by an explicit incorporation of asymmetricity of countries. Thus, we
explore the transition dynamics through a set of simulations. We especially
concentrate on the role of production factors, the role of export self-selectivity,
and productivity diﬀusion on the transition dynamics of an emerging economy,
which converges to its more advanced counterpart. The simulation inquiry on
the model properties is as follows.
First, we compare the extended model transition dynamics with those implied
by alternative formulations. In particular, we contrast the extended model
with (i) a model without quality investments as a speciﬁc production factor,
(ii) a model under diﬀerent ﬁnancial structure and (iii) a model without the
export self-selectiveness (thus without a prominent NIM feature). Other as-
pects and structural parameters of the alternative models are held constant,
thus one can sense how various model assumptions are translated into model
dynamics.
Second, we provide a set of trade-barriers removals experiments using alter-
native models since we believe that this set can also yield valuable insights on
model properties. This is a popular issue with applied international models
(see Bayoumi et al 2004). We are inspired by exercises 3 by Bayoumi et al
3 Since the NIM framework seems to be better microfounded than standard open-
(2004) and by Baldwin (2005) and stress similarities and diﬀerences.
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and Section 3 characterizes the steady state. Section 4 highlights features of
the proposed model by contrasting them with alternative formulations. Sec-
tion 5 simulates policy interventions. Section 6 concludes. Appendix contains
detailed derivation of the model equations and discusses numerical methods
for model simulation.
2 Description of the Model
This section presents the workhorse model used throughout this paper. The
two countries are modeled in discrete time that runs from zero to inﬁnity. The
home country is populated by a representative competitive household who
has recursive preferences over discounted streams of momentary utilities. The
momentary utility is derived from consumption. A similar household inhabits
the foreign country. Production takes place in heterogenous production entities
called ﬁrms 4 .
2.1 Firms
In the domestic country, there is a large number of ﬁrms, which may be owned
by either a domestic or by a foreign household 5 . In each period there is an
unbounded mass of new, ex-ante identical, entrants. The entry of new ﬁrms
is costly because of investment costs and therefore households balance costs
and beneﬁts of additional entrants, they will ﬁnance and own.
economy models, it seems to be appropriate for welfare evaluation of policy regimes.
Naknoi et al. (2005) use the NIM framework to compare beneﬁts and costs of ﬁxed
versus ﬂexible exchange rate regimes and Baldwin and Okubo (2005) integrate the
NIM approach to a New Economic Geography model and derive a set of useful
normative assessments and positive political-economy predictions of economic inte-
gration.
4 The production entities are called ﬁrms. However, since we aim at understanding
the development of transition economies, which are likely to experience a signif-
icant change in the production structure, it would be more appropriate to think
of production entities as of production projects. In such an application, it may be
reasonable to calibrate the exit rate of production entities relatively high.
5 Since we aim at investigating the impact of cross-border asset ownership, we will
deal with a model version without cross-border asset ownership as well. However,
the workhorse version allows for endogenous cross-border asset ownerships.
9
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 791
August 2007Firms ex-post entry diﬀer by an idiosyncratic variation of the total factor
productivity: when a ﬁrm enters, it draws a shock z from a distribution G(z),
which has the support on hzL,zUi with 0 ≤ zL < zU < ∞. At the end of each
period, there is an exogenous probability that a ﬁrm is hit by an exit shock.
This probability is δ and is assumed to be independent on aggregate as well
as individual states. Hit ﬁrms shut down.
The production function maps two inputs into two outputs. The ﬁrst input is
ﬁxed and we label it as ‘capital’, the second input is variable and is labeled
as ‘labor’. The variable input – labor – is available in inelastic supply in each
country and is immobile between countries.
The ﬁrst output is quality h and if the ﬁrm j uses kj units of capital, then
the quality of its product is given simply as hj = kj. Capital investment can
be thus considered as an improvement in quality. The second output is the
physical quantity of produced goods x. The production function is given as
follows: xjt = zjAt`(ljt,kj). The production function ` is strictly increasing
in the ﬁrst argument (labor), but strictly decreasing in the second argument
(capital) 6 . This implies that investments into quality increase the needed la-
bor inputs to produce physical quantities. One may think that the production
of a more sophisticated good requires more labor or more skilled labor. Thus,
quality investment is costly for two reasons: ﬁrst, it requires ﬁxed input kj,
and second, more labor is required to produce better goods.
The production of the physical quantities is increasing in the level of ﬁrm
total factor productivity Atzj, which has two components: (a) idiosyncratic
component zj, which is i.i.d. across ﬁrms and which follows distribution G(z)
introduced above, and (b) the common component At. The total factor produc-
tivity At pertains to the ownerships: ﬁrms owned by the domestic household
enjoy at time t the productivity AH
t , while ﬁrms owned by the foreign house-
hold enjoy the productivity AF
t . The productivity does not depend on the
location of production or on the time of entry (the time of entry is henceforth
called vintage) of ﬁrms.
We assume that the ﬁnal output of the ﬁrm is given by the product of quality
and quantity: qjt = hjxjt and that this ﬁnal quality-quantity bundle is what is
sold at the market. This assumption reﬂects the nowadays standard approach
of growth theoreticians, for example Young (1998). Thus, the production of
the ﬁnal bundle can be described as qjt = zjAtf(kj,ljt), where f is given as
f(kj,ljt) ≡ kj`(ljt,kj). We assume that the ﬁnal bundle production function
is increasing in both arguments and is homogenous of degree one. This places
some restrictions on the quantity production function `; the most important
6 We require that the function ` is strictly decreasing in the capital. If the function
` were not decreasing in capital, the linearity of hj in kj would imply endogenous
growth, as in Young (1998) or Baldwin, Forslid (2000).
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restriction is that ` should be homogenous of degree zero.The quality investment is a ﬁxed factor, set at the time of entry, while labor
can be freely adjusted 7 . Given a realization of the productivity shock zj, the
probability of the exit shock δ, and a chosen production plan, the value of a
ﬁrm is determined by the stream of discounted proﬁts. Given a realization of
the productivity shock zj, the probability of the exit shock δ, and a chosen
production plan, the value of a ﬁrm is determined by the expected present
value of the stream of proﬁts.
Since the presented model involves several kinds of goods and ﬁrms, we have
to use indexes to distinguish them. To make reading the paper easier, we
introduce the following convention. Firms diﬀer by location, ownership, and
vintage. Location of ﬁrms is distinguished by superscript d - for the domestic
country and f - for the foreign country. Firms owned by the foreign household
are denoted by the ∗ superscript, while the domestic ownership is given no
special superscript. Vintage is denoted by Greek letters τ, σ, while the real
time is denoted by Latin character t, v.
Firms produce diﬀerentiated goods. The good produced by the ﬁrm located in
the destination market is denoted by the d superscript, while goods imported
are denoted by the m superscript. The destination market is denoted by the
* superscript again: goods consumed by the domestic household are without
superscript, while goods consumed by the foreign household do have it. Thus
pd
jt will denote the price of a good produced by a ﬁrm j located in the domestic
country at time t sold to the domestic market, pm
jt is the price of a good j
imported to the domestic market from the foreign country, while pm∗
jt would
be a price of a good from the domestic country to the foreign household. We
further assume that prices are denominated in the currency of the market.
According to the introduced convention, Pd
jτt denotes a t-period real operating
proﬁt of the ﬁrm located in the domestic country of vintage τ and owned by
the domestic household. The real operating proﬁt Pd



















t zjf(kj,ljt) − Wtljt,
where 0 ≤ κjt ≤ 1 is the share of product sold in the domestic markets, Pt is
the domestic price level, P ∗
t is the foreign price level, ηt is the real exchange
rate, which is linked to the nominal exchange rate st as ηt = stP ∗
t /Pt, t ≥ 0
represents unit iceberg exporting costs and Wt is the real wage. Firms of dif-
ferent vintage and diﬀerent ownership have diﬀerent levels of invested capital,
7 The capital is ﬁrm speciﬁc and the model lacks the usual one-lag time-to-build
assumption. The time-to-build is not needed in our model since we aim at long-run
dynamics, not at short-run ﬂuctuations.
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jτt will be naturally diﬀerent along these dimensions. Similar
deﬁnitions apply to the remaining types of ﬁrms as well.
Note that prices such as pd
jt are prices of the ﬁnal quantity-quality bundles and
therefore derived indexes Pt, P ∗
t , ηt are related to aggregations of these ﬁnal
bundles. The prices related to physical quantities are then given by ℘d
jt ≡ kjpd
jt.
The discussion about distinct roles of prices of quality-quantity bundles and
of prices deﬁned on physical quantities is left to subsection 2.4.
Firms may export only if special ﬁxed costs are sunk. If a ﬁrm at the time of
entry decides to sunk the ﬁxed export costs, then it becomes eligible to export
in all subsequent periods, otherwise it is for all periods not eligible to export.
Exporting decisions of eligible ﬁrms are taken on a period-by-period basis.
Thus an eligible ﬁrm may decide not to export in a given period. However, in
equilibrium all eligible ﬁrms will ﬁnd proﬁtable to export in any period; even
in the case of very unfavorable prices, eligible ﬁrms will export at least a small
amount of production (see Lemma 1 in 2.1.2). Unit iceberg exporting costs t
represents transportation costs, policy barriers such as tariﬀs, while the ﬁxed
costs may represent expenditures associated with acquiring necessary expertise
such as legal, business, or accounting issues of the foreign markets. Obviously,
non-eligible ﬁrms have κjt ≡ 1 regardless of the state of the world.
Capital is the ﬁxed factor and each ﬁrm decides how much capital to acquire at
the time of entry: this means that the ﬁrm decides the quality of its product at
the entry time, while produced quantities are variable during its lifetime. We





where the superscript refers to eligibility, i.e. e − eligible or n − noneligible:
eligible ﬁrms pay larger ﬁxed costs.
The cost structure implies – as in Melitz (2003) – that in equilibrium there is
a cut-oﬀ productivity value z, such that ﬁrms with lower idiosyncratic produc-
tivity zj < z will not invest to become eligible, while ﬁrms with a suﬃciently
high productivity level zj ≥ z will do 8 .
Three types of entry costs are usually dealt with in the NIM framework (Bald-
win 2005): the ﬁrst one is the invention cost, i.e. a cost of inventing a new
variety. After a variety is invented and its productivity is revealed, there is a
ﬁxed set-up cost of production and ﬁnally there is also a ﬁxed cost of export
eligibility. Not in all models, all types of costs are necessarily present, but the
8 We assume that if a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent whether to become export eligible, it
will decide to become. This is completely an innocent assumption provided that
the distribution function G is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure: in such a case the probability of indiﬀerence is zero.
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der the model speciﬁcation employed here, the ﬁxed cost cn is actually a cost
of inventing a new variety (an action, which is not necessarily proﬁtable ex-
post 9 ), while the diﬀerence ce −cn would correspond to the export-eligibility
costs.
The ﬁxed cost of the production set-up is not present in this model. Never-
theless the formulation of the model implies that all ﬁrms ﬁnd proﬁtable to
spend strictly positive investment into quality (kj > 0), since otherwise its
products would be worthless. Therefore, there are set-up costs given by kj,
but these are variable, since capital is invested after learning zj and there-
fore invested capital will be diﬀerent for ﬁrms with diﬀerent zj. Note that the
invested capital as a function of the idiosyncratic shock is not likely to be
continuous: in fact it exhibits a jump discontinuity at z: the invested capital
jumps at the margin when a ﬁrm decides to become export-eligible. Figure
2 illustrates this fact. Subﬁgures show the optimal quality investment kj as
a function of idiosyncratic productivity zj for ﬁrms located in the domestic
country under both ownerships. The upper subﬁgure shows this for a sym-
metric steady state, while the lower subﬁgure shows asymmetric steady state
with AH = 0.7AF. The rest of parametrization corresponds to the baseline
of Section 4.1. The jumps occur at the cut-oﬀ level. As can be expected, the
investment into quality is higher for a foreignly owned ﬁrm than for a domes-
tically owned ﬁrm under the symmetric steady state. The reason is the higher
productivity AF of foreignly owned ﬁrms. Naturally, this asymmetry collapses
in the case of symmetric steady state.
There are two parameters related to the degree of trade frictions and trade
openness: the iceberg costs t and the ratio ce/cn. The fall in the former is re-
lated to a fall in iceberg (ad valorem) costs, which are for example transporta-
tion costs, while the latter is ﬁxed in nature. Section 5 simulates consequences
of declines in both types of costs and discusses the diﬀerences. This is in our
view an important, but sometimes neglected, issue. The study by Bayoumi et
al. (2004) considers only a decrease in iceberg costs, which is insuﬃcient for
the comprehensive modeling of macroeconomic consequences of the EU inte-
gration. Garganas (2004) argues that the integration to the EU is probably
more appropriately seen as a fall in ﬁxed trade costs because of integration of
legal and institutional environments and therefore we provide both kinds of
simulations. Nevertheless, the EU accession is not only about the trade barri-
ers removal – which happened in earlier years of transition (Roland, 2004) –
but also about ﬁnancial integration. Indeed, the institutional accession close to
the EU structures may diminish fears of political reversals, and implementa-
tion of acquis communautaire has improved legal environments. Both of which
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sible way of modeling the degree of ﬁnancial integration and openness will be
discussed in Subsection 2.3.
We assume that ﬁrm’s manager maximizes the expected discounted stream of
proﬁts. The discounting respects the ownerships. Thus, the value of the proﬁt
stream of the ﬁrm of vintage τ, enjoying the idiosyncratic productivity level
zj and owned by the domestic household is (in real terms):
V
d










ξ + k), (1)
where Pd
jτt is the t-time real operating proﬁt of a ﬁrm of vintage τ, enjoying
the productivity level zj under the optimal production plan (derived later in




τ is the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution between dates τ
and t. The rate of the intertemporal substitution is deﬁned in more details in
Subsection 2.2. The value of the ﬁrm owned by the foreign household is deﬁned
analogously, with the exception that the marginal rate of the intertemporal
substitution is taken from the perspective of the foreign household.
To summarize the sequencing, the timing proceeds ﬁrst with the domestic and
foreign households’ decision about a number of new entrants in both countries.
Then, each new entrant draws a productivity level from the distribution G and
the owner decides the amount of invested capital and whether to invest for
export eligibility. Then, labor demand and production (of both entrants and
incumbents) take place. At the end of the period, some ﬁrms experience the
exit shock and shut down.
Even ﬁrms located in the same country and owned by the same household
diﬀer along two dimensions: idiosyncratic productivity level zj and vintage τ.
Ownership within each country aﬀects the amount of invested capital since
both households have diﬀerent rates of the intertemporal substitution along
the transition path. Likewise, the vintage aﬀects incentives to invest. This im-
plies that ﬁrms of diﬀerent vintage and ownership will invest diﬀerent amounts
of capital, even if they experience the same idiosyncratic productivity level.
Therefore we shall deﬁne the time-varying distribution measure over ﬁrms
as Γd
t(j,τ) for the ﬁrms in the home country owned by the domestic house-
hold; the star version Γd∗
t (j,τ) will denote the analogous measure for the ﬁrms
owned by the foreign household. The counterparts of ﬁrms located in the for-




t (j,τ). The superscript convention
applied to the distributions follows the one applied to ﬁrms.
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where λτt represents suitable integrands (such as prices or quantities) of vin-
tage τ at time t and ne
τ is the number of d-type entrants of vintage τ. Therefore
ne
τ(1 − δ)t−τ is the number of ﬁrms, which has entered at time τ and are still






t (j,τ) as well.
2.1.1 Market Structure
The ﬁnal good 10 Q in domestic country is composed of a continuum of quality-
quantity bundles (goods), some of them are produced in the domestic country
and some are imported. There is an imperfect substitution among these goods.
The parameter θ > 1 measures substitution among goods. The limit case θ →
∞ implies perfect substitution and hence perfect competition. The aggregate




































where, qj is the output of the ﬁrm j, Ωd denotes the set of products of ﬁrms
located in the domestic country and owned by the domestic household, Ωd∗
denotes the set of products of ﬁrms located in the domestic country and owned
by the foreign household. The analogous convention holds for sets of ﬁrms
located in the foreign country: Ωf, Ωf∗. If a set is labeled by the subscript
e, it reads as a subset of eligible ﬁrms. Thus, Ωf∗
e ⊂ Ωf∗ is the subset of
goods produced by eligible ﬁrms owned by the foreign household located in the
foreign country 11 . The ﬁnal good in the foreign country is deﬁned similarly.




































where pjt is the price of products of ﬁrm j at time t. Note that the ﬁnal good
Qt represents both physical quantities as well as qualities and that the price
10 The ﬁnal good is consumption as well as investment good, so that Q can be
interpreted as domestic absorption.
11 Therefore it holds that qd
j ∈ Ωd or qd
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For the sake of reader’s convenience, we stress that the distribution Γd
t(j,τ)indexes Pt, P ∗
t aggregate both: available quantities and qualities. In that sense,
these are quality-adjusted price indexes. If one wants to construct counterparts
of empirical price indexes, one has to aggregate price ℘d
jt, rather than pd
jt.




















Analogous formulae apply to the residual demands at the foreign market as
well.
2.1.2 Optimal Plans
In this part, we derive optimal production and investment plans using the
backward induction. We derive it for a ﬁrm located in the domestic coun-
try, which is owned by the domestic household. The reader can then easily
derive optimal plans for other types of ﬁrms. This part of the paper shows
the backward induction for general neoclassical production function satisfy-
ing the Inada condition at zero (thus we rule out the constant-elasticity-of-
substitution production functions, with the elasticity of substitution less than
one 12 ). The parametric example of model equations for the Cobb-Douglas
production function is given in Appendix A.1.
Thus, assume the problem of maximizing the value of a ﬁrm, under given
location, ownership, and sunk investments. Since there are no labor adjust-
ment costs, labor decisions are made on a period-by-period basis. Standard
results of monopolistically competitive pricing suggest that prices are set as
a mark-up over marginal costs. Marginal costs diﬀer by idiosyncratic produc-
tivity and invested capital, thus ﬁrms enjoying identical productivity levels
zj and identical capital levels kj are supposed to price identically, but ﬁrms







produce diﬀerent outputs. Simultaneously with prices, ﬁrms also decide κj.
12 This requirement is imposed to rule out the corner solution, which would com-
plicate the algebra of the model. The corner solution will be ruled out if the factor
price is lower than the marginal product of the factor at zero (which is always the
case if the production function obeys the Inada condition at zero). Anyhow, if one
is willing to undergo complications induced by possibility that some ﬁrms will not
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produce goods for both markets (if they produce at all).
Lemma 1 Under the monopolistically competitive CES market structures with
θ < ∞, eligible ﬁrms produce for both markets.
PROOF. Deﬁne qjt = qd
jt + qm∗
jt and consider an eligible ﬁrm. We will show
that qd
jtqm∗





























jt∗ ≥ 0. (4)


















jt are Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the non-negativity con-
straints. These multipliers satisfy: λ
ξ



























θ θ − 1
θ
= MCjt > 0,
which implies that λd
jt = λm∗








θ → +∞, thus
proving the claim.
Since it is impossible that eligible ﬁrms would experience strictly lower ex-
pected present value of its operating proﬁt stream than non-eligible ﬁrms
(eligible ﬁrms can always secure as large expected present value of operating
proﬁt streams as non-eligible ﬁrms by selling the total output at the domestic
market), and since they sell at least some amount at the foreign market, we
immediately get the following corollary:
Corollary: Lemma 1 implies that eligible ﬁrms experience a strictly higher
expected present value of the operating proﬁt stream than non-eligible ﬁrms.
Now, let us take the perspective of a non-eligible ﬁrm of vintage τ and produc-
tivity level AH
t . Its real operating proﬁt Pdn
jτt in a period t is given – conditional
on non-eligibility status, aggregate productivity, idiosyncratic productivity zj,
17
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The second row of expression (5) (and the subsequent expression) follows from
the CES market structure. Similarly, the real operating proﬁt of an eligible
ﬁrm Pde











































By comparing (5) with (6), it is obvious that if κjt < 1, then for given capital
and idiosyncratic shocks zj, Pde
jτt > Pdn
jτt. Indeed, Lemma 1 shows that κjt < 1
is the optimal choice of an eligible ﬁrm.












with ξ ∈ {n,e}. It is obvious that Pde
jτ > Pdn
jτ. The expected present values
depend on idiosyncratic productivity zj, invested capital kj, and the future
path of productivities, real wages and demands.
The optimal investment decision of an eligible ﬁrm located in the domestic
country and owned by the domestic household, which enjoys a productivity
level zj, maximizes the value of the ﬁrm, which is given as
V
de















e + kj) (7)
and similarly for a non-eligible ﬁrm:
V
dn













n + kj). (8)
Maximization of Vde
τ (kj|zj) (resp. Vdn
τ (kj|zj)) yields the optimal demand for
quality investment (capital) for eligible (resp. non-eligible) ﬁrms, and the value
of a ﬁrm is:
V
dξ
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τ (zj), V de
τ (zj) implicitly deﬁne the cut-oﬀ
value z, which is the least idiosyncratic shock, which makes the the export-







τ (zj) ≥ V
dn
τ (zj)).
The value of a ﬁrm is given by
V
d









τ (zj) if zj ≥ zd
τ
V dn
τ (zj) if zj < zd
τ
,
and the expected value of a new entrant, owned by the domestic household,










This completes the backward induction.
The, just derived, optimal production plan induces a measure over ﬁrms. De-
note e Pd
τ,t the t-time expected real operating proﬁt of a domestically-owned





jτt G(dzj), and e cd
τ the expected real investment costs un-








τ (1 − δ)
σe P
d
τ,τ+σ − e c
d
τ.






















The ﬁrst two terms correspond to the expected ﬁxed costs, while the last two
terms correspond to the expected costs of capital investment. The expected
investment costs diﬀer across locations, vintages, and ownerships and this is
because (i) the cut-oﬀ values diﬀer across these dimensions too (as was al-
ready described) and (ii) these dimensions also change the optimal amount




j . Therefore – in accordance with the con-
vention introduced above – we will denote expected real investment costs in
the domestic country from the perspective of the domestic household by e cd
t
13 It is worth to mention that the cut-oﬀ value diﬀers across locations and vintages
(since ﬁrms located in diﬀerent location and / or ﬁrms appeared in diﬀerent times
face diﬀerent relative prices) and across ownership (because the marginal rate of
substitution is – in general – diﬀerent).
19
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 791
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t . The counterpart of
these costs in the foreign country will be denoted as e c
f
t (from the perspective
of the domestic household) and as e c
f∗
t (when foreign household’s perspective
is taken).
2.2 Household behavior
The home country is populated by a representative competitive household
who has recursive preferences over discounted stochastic streams of period
utilities. The period utilities are derived from consumption of the aggregate
good. Leisure does not enter the utility, so labor is supplied inelastically. The
aggregate labor supply in the domestic country is L, while L∗ is the aggregate
labor supply in the foreign country. Households can trade bonds denominated
in the foreign currency.
































t + Tt, (11)
where Bt is the real bond holding of the domestic household, Ct is consump-
tion, r∗
t−1 is the real interest rate of the internationally traded bond, ΨB
presents adjustment portfolio costs, as in Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2003) to sta-
bilize the model 14 , and Tt is the rebate of these costs in a lump-sum fashion
to the household. The ﬂow of real operating proﬁts from the ownerships of
ﬁrms of all vintages owned by the domestic household located in the domestic
country is denoted as Ξd













14 In a strict sense, the model is stable even without portfolio adjustment costs
(i.e. under ΨB = 0). The model is deterministic and therefore it would not exhibit
the unit-root behavior even under ΨB = 0. On the other hand, if ΨB = 0, then
the model would exhibit the steady state dependence on the initial asset holding.
Therefore we use the nontrivial adjustment costs ΨB > 0 to give up the dependence
of the steady state on the initial asset holding.
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Because of the law of large numbers and of perfect foresight, the ex-ante ex-
pected values of the key variables for household decisions (such as investment
costs or proﬁt ﬂows) coincide with ex-post realizations.
The number of new domestically located entrants owned by the domestic
household in time t is nd
t, while e χ(nd) presents the real investment cost asso-
ciated with entry of nd entrants. These costs are given as follows:
e χ(n
d













The ﬁrst term is obvious – it is the expected investment cost (where the
expectation is taken with respect to the measure induced by the optimal pro-
duction plan). The second term may be interpreted as adjustment costs (e.g.
due to limited supply of skills needed to run ﬁrms, such as legal expertise),
and its purpose is to mitigate knife-edge conditions on household investments.
These adjustment costs are assumed to be rebated by the lump-sum fashion
to households (e.g. they are included in Tt). Similarly, n
f
t denotes number of
new entrants in the foreign country owned by the domestic household. The
associated costs are given as
b χ(n
f













The two functions e χ, b χ diﬀer by terms Ψd, Ψf only. The parameter Ψd is
the adjustment cost of investing in the resident country (i.e. in the domestic
country for the domestic household and in the foreign country for the foreign
household), while the parameter Ψf is the adjustment cost of investing in the
non-resident country.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the domestic household are standard ones:
u





































Working Paper Series No 791





































It is worth to note that although there is an idiosyncratic variance at the
ﬁrm level, the model is deterministic at the aggregate level, thus the dynasty
problem is deterministic too. Therefore the marginal rate of substitution does
not involve the expectation operator. The Euler equation (14) can be then
restated as:








The household problem in the foreign country is deﬁned symmetrically. Thus,
the budget constraint reads as follows:
B
∗



















































































The Euler equations of both households imply a consumption-based version














Bonds are denominated in the foreign currency and since the model is de-
terministic, this is a completely innocent assumption. The international bond
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As described above, the parameter t and the ratio ce/cn model the degree of
trade openness. Changes in the former might be more appropriate for modeling
changes in transport technology, while changes in the latter are more relevant
for modeling the accession to the EU institutional structures. The accession
diminishes the trade costs above all by uniforming legal, business or cultural
environments and translates into a decrease in ﬁxed costs of exporting.
But the convergence towards the EU structures has probably even more im-
portant aspect, which is ﬁnancial openness and integration 15 . There are two
ways of modeling ﬁnancial openness in this framework, the ratio Ψf/Ψd and
the parameter ΨB. The parameter ΨB models costs of consumption-smoothing
by debt accumulation. The real-world counterpart of this debt may be rep-
resented by other capital ﬂows than foreign direct investment (FDI). If this
parameter is huge, households of the converging economy have little possi-
bilities of consumption smoothing and the consumption path and the output
growth will closely follow the productivity growth. On the other hand, if the
portfolio-adjustment cost parameter ΨB is low, the transition economy can ac-
cumulate debt to smooth the consumption and even the output growth may
be more rapid than the productivity growth, since transition economy can
borrow also for investments. Nevertheless, the impact on the consumption is
more signiﬁcant.
The ratio of Ψf/Ψd is related to FDI. If the ratio is not too high, the advanced-
economy household has the incentive to invest in the converging country. Pa-
rameters Ψf and Ψd can be seen as reduced-form modeling devices for agency
costs. An alternative story behind the parameter Ψf is the perceived country-
speciﬁc risk. It is well intuitive that a fall in agency costs or a fall in perceived
risk will increase incentives for foreign direct investments. It is worth to men-
tion that the assumption that the quadratic adjustment costs are returned to
the households in a lump-sum fashion is done for analytical convenience only
– the assumption avoids unnecessary complications due to the income eﬀect.
Both channels of ﬁnancial integration enable the transition economy to smooth
consumption, which can be shown to be beneﬁcial for both countries. But
there is an important distinction between the two mechanisms: a fall in ΨB
only smoothed consumption along the convergence trajectory, but it does not
change the steady state. On the other hand, a fall in Ψf not only increases
the consumption smoothing during the transition, but also aﬀects the steady
state. Macroeconomists are puzzled by the fact that model-based estimation
15 Surprisingly, this important aspect of the accession to the monetary union is
not considered in the elaborate model by Bayoumi et al. (2004), which aims at
assessments of costs and beneﬁts of monetary-union integration.
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chas and Jeanne (2006). The reason is that speeding capital accumulation in
the standard Ramsey framework has a temporary eﬀect only. A prominent
setting, which yields permanent eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization, identiﬁes
beneﬁts from risk diversiﬁcation as a source of large welfare gains of ﬁnan-
cial liberalization, see Obstﬂed (1994), Henry (2006). Although the presented
model is deterministic – and therefore risk diversiﬁcation plays no role – it can
mimic a similar pattern: ﬁnancial integration has positive permanent welfare
gains for both countries. From the formal point of view, this results is achieved
by quadratic adjustment costs (12), (13). Indeed, if we accept the view that
quadratic adjustment costs represent a reduced form of agency costs, then a
fall in Ψd can be considered as an improvement in the domestic ﬁnancial tech-
nology, which is widely believed to aﬀect economic performance, see Levine
(1997). Similarly, a fall in Ψf can be viewed as international ﬁnancial integra-
tion (perhaps because of adopting the common legal system, which decreases
agency costs for foreigners). In any case, a fall in Ψf speeds transition (in
terms of output and real wage convergence) and increases output 16 in both
countries with larger welfare gains for a smaller and less advanced country
(where the agency costs are more important because of resource constraints
bind tighter).
2.4 Notes on Price Indexes
As mentioned above, prices pjt and the corresponding price indexes Pt, and
P ∗
t are quality-adjusted prices. Therefore, the real wages Wt and W∗
t and the
real exchange rate ηt are measured in the terms of qualities. These measures
correspond to real-world price indexes only if the latter are quality-adjusted
perhaps using a hedonic approach, which is rarely a case for transition coun-
tries (Ahnert and Kenny, 2004, p. 28). To get indexes closer to real-world
measures, we have to deﬁne aggregate indexes over ℘jt. Denote such indexes
as Pt and P∗
t .
Br˚ uha and Podpiera (2007) use a simple approximation to P and set
Pt = KtPt,
where Kt is the total amount of invested capital by ﬁrms selling its products
16 Under the present setting, a fall in Ψ increases the steady-state output level. One
can conjecture that under endogenous growth, it will increase the growth rate as
well. To conﬁrm or reject this conjecture is left for future research.
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Nevertheless, Pt might diﬀer from the CPI-based real-world indexes by one
more term. The market structure based on the CES aggregation implies the
love-for-variety eﬀect, which means that the welfare-theoretical price index
diﬀers from the ‘average’ price by the term ν
1
θ−1, where ν is the number of
available varieties and θ is the parameter of substitution in the CES function
(see Melitz, 2003 for rigorous deﬁnition and derivation of the average price).
Therefore, we distinguish the following deﬁnitions of the real exchange rate:
Quality-adjusted theoretically-consistent RER ηt is the real exchange
rate, which enters the decisions of agents in the model.
Quality-unadjusted theoretically-consistent RER is the real exchange













θ−1 ηt, where νt and ν∗
t is the number of varieties
available at time t in the domestic and foreign country, respectively.
Quality-unadjusted CPI-based RER is probably the correct counterpart










As discussed below in Section 3, the quality-adjusted theoretically consistent
real exchange rate ηt depreciates during the transition and the reason is that
the quality-quantity bundles produced in the transition country becomes less
and less scarce. On the other hand, the three remaining indexes appreciate
because both investments to quality and the love-for-variety eﬀect outweigh
the depreciation of ηt.
The distinction among various deﬁnitions of real exchange rate is reﬂected
also in comparison of the economic performance of countries. If one wants to





L , where Yt = Qt+ηtXt, Y ∗
t = Q∗
t −Xt are the model counterparts
of real GDP (in the currency of the respective country) and Xt is the value
of net real exports of the domestic country expressed in the foreign currency.
On the other hand, if one wants to compute a model counterpart of the ratio
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As usual, the general equilibrium is deﬁned as a time proﬁle of prices such
that all households optimize and all markets clear. Since there are no price




t=0 matter. The general equilibrium requires that the market-
clearing conditions hold.

































t (j,τ) = L, (27)
where ljt is the labor demand by individual ﬁrms, and L is the aggregate,
inelastic, labor supply.
Analogous market clearing conditions hold in the foreign country. The inter-
national bond market equilibrium requires that
Bt + B
∗
t = 0. (28)
The last equilibrium condition is the balance-of-payment equilibrium, which
requires that:
Bt+1 = (1 + r
∗



















where Xt is the value of net real exports of the domestic country expressed in
the foreign currency.
The deﬁnition of the general equilibrium is again very standard. A more in-
volved task is to simulate the transition dynamics, because the model is ef-
fectively a vintage type model. However, if one realizes that the model can be
rewritten in the ﬁrst-order form of f(xt,xt−1) = 0, – the full set of equations
of the model in the ﬁrst-order form are available in Appendix A.2 – then the
26
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 791
August 2007variety of methods can be used to simulate the model. The method actually
used is described in Appendix A.3.
3 Steady state
The steady state is the long-run equilibrium and it is obtained when exogenous
parameters (particulary productivity parameters AF and AH and ﬁnancial and
trade costs) are constant for a suﬃciently long period of time. The speed of
convergence to the steady state is inﬂuenced mainly by parameters β and δ.
The steady state is characterized by a number of features. The most important
(and intuitive) ones include:
• Zero bond holding Bss = 0, which is due to adjustment costs ψB.
• Constant endogenous quantities and prices.
• The steady-state eﬀective discount rate reads as 1
1−β(1−δ) and the steady-
state interest rate rss = β−1 − 1.
• If the net asset positions are zero, then the net exports are zero as well.
• In the steady state, the distribution of ﬁrms degenerate over the vintage
dimension: thus one can write Γd
ss(j) instead of Γd
ss(j,τ).
In this section, we discuss how properties of the steady state are inﬂuenced by
the productivity parameters AH and AF. We concentrates especially on the
real exchange rate.
Consider a canonical two-country model with diﬀerentiated goods (to allow
for ﬁnite price elasticity) without the vertical and horizontal investments (new
varieties and quality) and without the extensive export margin. Such model
would predict that an increase in the productivity (uniform across all sectors)
in one country would cause the real-exchange rate of that country to depreci-
ate. The intuition is straightforward: the output expansion can be sustained
as an equilibrium only if the corresponding prices decline.
This does not ﬁt well with the observation that more advanced countries tend
to have higher price levels, nor it ﬁts the experience of transition countries,
which are becoming able to sell more for higher prices (see Fact 4 in Introduc-
tion).
To explain the fact that more advanced countries tend to have higher price
level, it is commonly assumed that the productivity growth is biased towards
the sector of tradable goods. Then, it is possible to obtain a real-exchange rate
appreciation because of a rise in price of non-traded goods (this is the noto-
rious Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson story, henceforth HBS). Nevertheless, such a
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in tradable sector declines 17 : export prices of such country will decline rela-
tive to import prices. This implication of the HBS story is in contradiction
with empirical ﬁnding for transition countries, see for instance Cincibuch and
Podpiera (2006) and Podpiera (2005).
There are several possibilities how to generate real-exchange rate appreciation
after a uniform productivity increase. First, if one works with a model, where
the number of varieties is endogenous (such as Krugman, 1979), then any mar-
ket structure featuring love-for-variety, which is inter alia case for the CES,
implies divergence between the welfare-theoretical price index and the price in-
dex based on ‘average’ prices. Therefore an increase in productivity may cause
the expansion of the number of varieties, which would mean that although the
exchange rate deﬁned per unit of utility or welfare depreciates, the exchange
rate deﬁned per unit of physical products may appreciate (see Section 2.4).
The intuition is that the variety expansion may increase the welfare derived
from the country export basket so that the consumers in both countries are
willing to pay higher average prices for the same or even higher quantity of
purchased goods. Thus, the love-for-variety eﬀect of the CES market structure
may represent a reduced-form modeling for the ﬁnal good quality 18 .
Another possibility is to explicitly introduce quality improvements. For exam-
ple, Dury and Oomen (2007) present such a model. They show that a quality
improvement leads to the appreciation of the real exchange rate deﬁned in
quality-unadjusted prices, provided that the quality improvement does not
decrease unit production costs. Dury and Oomen (2007) thus do not require
the new-varieties eﬀect. Note that the mechanism behind the model by Dury
and Oomen (2007) will work without any non-traded goods: it is simply based
on dichotomy between quality-adjusted and quality-unadjusted prices.
The third possibility is to introduce the extensive-export margin. For example,
Bergin et al (2006) present such a model and using numerical simulation they
show that it is possible to replicate the observation that the faster-growing
country tends to have a higher price level. The mechanism is based on self-
selection of high productive ﬁrms into the exporting sector. High productive
exporting ﬁrms push wages up even for non-exporting ﬁrms and this mech-
anism increases the price level of such country (thus, this is the standard
HBS mechanism). The self-selection mechanism suggests why the productiv-
ity gains are likely to be biased towards exporting sectors. Unfortunately,
Bergin et al (2006) do not report simulation of terms-of-trade thus it is not
17 Provided, of course, that tradable goods are not internationally homogeneous. If
they are, then terms-of-trade is trivially unity.
18 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this eﬀect alone would generate the real-exchange
rate appreciation strong enough to replicate the experience of transition countries.
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transition countries that terms-of-trade and real exchange rate both improve.
But it is unlikely that it is the case, since their model implies that more pro-
ductive ﬁrms charge lower prices (because of the downward sloping demand
curve derived from the CES assumption).
Thus, there are at least several independent possibilities how to generate a
real-exchange rate appreciation after an increase in productivity. See table 2
for an overview.
Models can hybridize these approaches: for example Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
use in their model two mechanisms: investments into new varieties and export-
eligibility margins. Thus Ghironi and Melitz (2005) are able to isolate three
mechanisms of the real exchange rate appreciation:
• an increase in domestic wages caused by an increase in the number of do-
mestic entrants,
• expenditures switching due to the love-for-variety;
• a decline in the share of the domestic traded goods (and an increase in
the foreign share), which means that the relatively less productive domestic
ﬁrms exit the tradable sector (and vice versa in the other country).
Nevertheless, a careful calibration suggests that the three mechanisms are not
enough to replicate the observed pace of the real exchange rate appreciation
in the CEE countries.
Therefore, we introduce the vertical investments (investments into quality im-
provements) into the NIM framework. Contrary to Dury and Oomen (2007),
we consider endogenous quality improvements: ﬁrms decide to invest into qual-
ity improvements only if they expect that the investment will be proﬁtable.
The straightforward application of the envelope theorem to (5) and (6) reveals
that the present value of real operating proﬁts P
dξ
j is increasing in A. By (7)





so that the increase in the TFP boosts the quality investments. Therefore,
the vertical margin adds an additional force for the long-run exchange rate
appreciation after an increase in the average productivity.
4 An Inquiry on Model Dynamics
This section inquires about model dynamics and explains the role of model
components. Since the proposed model extends the canonical framework and
is solved for transition dynamics, the model properties ought to be primarily
investigated with respect to the extension. In addition, the standard model
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Therefore, we have focused on three major building blocks, namely on the
role of production factors, the role of the export self-selectivity, and on the
meaning of the productivity diﬀusion for the transition dynamics of an emerg-
ing economy that is converging to its developed counterpart. In particular, the
most important features of the proposed model consist of the following:
Several dimensions of investments: the present model allows for horizon-
tal investments to new varieties, vertical investments to quality, and invest-
ment to export-eligibility. Ghironi, Melitz (2005) model possesses horizontal
investments and export-eligibility investments; Bergin et al (2006) considers
export eligibility investments only, while Dury and Oomen (2007) ignore
horizontal and export eligibility investments and concentrates on vertical
(quality) investments only. Thus various models introduce various invest-
ment dimensions and thus it is important to learn their exact implications.
Asymmetric countries: most models are solved for a steady state of sym-
metric countries. We allow for asymmetricity both in the level of develop-
ment and in size measured by labor forces. The crucial issue is whether and
how the transition dynamics can diﬀer when a small country converges to
a bigger one (such as in the case of CEE country convergence to the EU)
from the case where the converging country is comparable in the size to
the developed world (this will be a relevant case if one wishes to investigate
other emerging economies such as India).
Cross-border asset ownerships: in order to replicate the pace and the
structure of the ﬁnancial account, the present model introduces the cross-
border asset ownerships. It is important to understand the value added of
such a feature and how it inﬂuences the model properties.
Trade frictions: the present model has two kinds of trade barriers (iceberg
costs and export-eligibility costs) and thus it is investigated what these
barriers imply for the model properties. This issue is left to Section 5.
4.1 Calibration of the Model
Under the proposed modeling framework, one can investigate a number of
changes in model parameters in the consistent framework of the general equi-
librium; experiments of main interest are with an exogenous convergence of
the domestic total factor productivity to the foreign level: AH
t → AF . After
the TFP convergence is reached AH
t = AF, both economies converge to the
steady state. As mentioned earlier, the speed of convergence to the steady
state is inﬂuenced mainly by parameters β and δ.
The calibration of the model for simulations is close to the calibration of the
model that were used for successful replication of the macroeconomic dynamics
30
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 791
August 2007in selected CEE by Br˚ uha and Podpiera (2007) and for the Czech Republic
alone by Br˚ uha, Podpiera, and Pol´ ak (2007). Nevertheless, the diﬀerence is
that here we do not aim at replicating the dynamics, but rather at highlighting
the most important features of the model with realistic calibration using a set
of computational experiments.
In the parametrization we assume two countries that have liberalized current
and ﬁnancial account of the balance of payments: free debt securities trading
on which is levied a portfolio adjustment cost of ΨB = 0.01 (identical cali-
bration to Ghironi and Melitz, 2005), further permitted acquiring of national
assets only with associated portfolio adjustment costs of the size Ψd = 0.7.
In both cases, the adjustment costs are relatively small (they are between 1%
and 3% of GDP). The only purpose of the portfolio-adjustment cost ΨB is to
avoid the initial-conditions dependence.
The trade liberalization is represented by a low value of transaction costs
(0.05), and the export eligibility costs are twice higher than costs for non-
eligibility to export (domestic market entry). The calibration is higher than in
Ghironi and Melitz (2005), but the reader has to have in mind that we consider
once-and-for-all export-eligibility costs while Ghironi and Melitz (2005) have
period-by-period export-eligibility costs. The present value of these costs for a
ﬁrm deciding to export in all periods of its expected lifetime is actually higher
in their model than in our.
The values cn and ce are calibrated to reﬂect the consumption-to-absorbtion
and investment-to-absorbtion ratio observed in data. These ratios (both in
data 19 and in the model) are about 70% and 30%.
The convergence of a less developed to a more developed country, in terms of
total factor productivity, starts at 70 percent of the developed country, which
is motivated by the initial position of a typical transition country from CEE,
such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
The exit rate for companies is ﬁfty per cent, which means that the average
duration of a project is two years and reﬂects higher frequency of closures
and entries of companies in a transition economy. In comparison to a steady
state exit rate in developed countries, such as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005),
where the job destruction rate is 10 percent a year (U.S. evidence), our ﬁve
times higher calibration also with respect to the processes taking place in the
converging country might be quite realistic. At the same time, a higher exit
rate should not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the developed country.
19 Note that when dealing with the absorption in data, we divide the government
consumption into consumption and investments. This is necessary for comparison
of the model and data, since the model lacks the public sector.
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twenty eight percent, which falls into the conventional calibration range in the
literature. Standard macro models such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1992)
use θ = 6, while Ghironi amd Melitz (2005) opt for a value of 3.8 (based on
empirically found mark-ups for the U.S. by Bernard et al, 2003). Since the
diﬀerence in the two mentioned models is in the presence or absence of entry
costs, the interpretation of the average vs. marginal costs is crucial. While
the mark-ups over average vs. marginal costs are equal in the model without
entry costs, the model with entry costs has diﬀerent mark-ups over marginal
and average costs. Consequently, a model with entry costs and lower θ would
correspond to the same mark-ups over average costs in a model without entry
costs and higher θ. Based on the evidence of mark-ups over average costs in
the Czech Republic, provided by Podpiera and Rakov´ a (2006), in the range of
15-20 percent, we calibrate the model parameter of elasticity of substitution
at the value of 4.5.
The calibration of the extent to which quality investment inﬂuences the pro-
duction of quality-quantity basket (α) is set to 0.35. This value is based on
the calibration experiments with regard to the pace of real exchange rate de-
velopment.
And ﬁnally, the choice of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the
discount factor are based on conventional calibration in the literature, i.e. 2
and 95 percent, respectively, which is identical to yearly frequency calibra-
tion in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Table 1 provides an overview of model’s
parameters calibration.
4.2 Setup of Simulations
There are two sets of simulations. The ﬁrst set concentrates on the role of spe-
ciﬁc types of investments, while the second set deals with the impact of active
cross-border asset ownership in the present model. The present model nests
all variants considered and thus by appropriately adjusting the calibration we
can reach all four distinct models, distinguished by the symbol B. Namely, we
distinguish:
Benchmark model B0 is the model, which is described in Section 2, but
without the cross-border assets. Formally, one sets Ψf → ∞.
Alternative model B1 is a version of the benchmark model B0, namely
without investment into quality. This can be formally achieved by setting
α = 0 and taking the relevant limit where necessary. Thus the core of the
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ity: simply all ﬁrms are eligible, but they invest into quality. This will be
an equilibrium outcome if ce − cn = 0.
Alternative model B3 is a model without both features, i.e. without export
eligibility and without investment to quality. Thus this variant can corre-
spond to international economics models with monopolistic competition,
Krugman (1979).
The assumption on the country size aﬀects the model dynamics. Thus we
simulate each model for two cases:
(1) converging economy is smaller than the developed one;
(2) both economies have the same size.
In the ﬁrst set of simulations we study the diﬀerences in convergence dynam-
ics across all four models. In the second set of simulations, we use the present
model and highlight the role of cross-border assets ownership and by the lo-
cation vs. ownership determined productivity. We compare three models: the
model without cross-border asset ownership, with active cross-border assets
ownership and productivity of investment by location (hence the productivity
of a ﬁrm owned by the foreign agent and located in the domestic country is AH
– labeled henceforth as AH case), and ﬁnally with active cross-border assets
ownership and productivity of investment by ownership (hence the productiv-
ity of such a ﬁrm is AF – this case is labeled AF case).
In addition, while we assume unequally developed countries (convergence is-
sue) throughout the simulations, we permit for relaxing the asymmetricity in
country sizes. Thus we perform both sets of simulations of all four models
under two size-scenarios: First, the converging economy is smaller than the
developed one (we chose that the foreign country is six time larger since in
such a situation, the larger country variables are almost uninﬂuenced by the
convergence of the smaller country: L∗ = 6L), and second, both economies
have the same size (L∗ = L).
Simulation experiments are done under the Cobb-Douglas production function
for production of the quality-quantity basket f(k,l) = kαl(1−α), the constant-
relative-risk-aversion momentary utility function u, and the uniform distribu-
tion for G(z); more details about functional forms and their implications are
given in the Appendix A.1. Calibration of the parameters is given in Table 1.
The simulations are performed for a hypothetical economy under the calibra-
tion given in Table 1 and simulations run from 1995 to 2170. It is assumed
that by 2040 the convergence is completed. We assume that the productivity
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F 1 + mexp(−(t − 1995)/ς)
1 + nexp(−(t − 1995)/ς)
,
and use the following numerical values: m = 8, n = 11, ς = 5. These values
imply that the initial factor productivity of the converging economy reaches
a slightly more than 75% of the value of the advanced country. By 2040 the
factor productivity diﬀerence is negligible. The next years are simulated in
order to settle the model in the steady state. In most cases, the model is
settled after 30 years. However, for some version of the model, one needs at
least 60 years to settle the model in the steady state. This occurs when one
assumes that the converging economy has the same size as its more developed
counterpart.
4.3 Results of Simulations
The output of the simulations is represented by a set of ﬁve variables: the ratio
of per capita GDP in both countries, an index of the welfare-theoretical real
exchange rate ηt, the real empirical exchange rate (an index of the quality-
unadjusted CPI-based real exchange rate), trade balance (as a percentage of
the domestic-country GDP), and debt (international bold holding), also as a
percentage of the domestic-country GDP.
Figures 3-6 display results for the ﬁrst set of simulations, while Figures 7-
Table 1
Parametrization of models
Parameter Workhorse model B0 Model B1 Model B2 Model B3
α 0.35 0 0.35 0
θ 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
β 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
δ 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
t 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
ε 2 2 2 2
ce 9.0 9.0 NA NA
cn 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Ψd 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
ΨB 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
AF 10 10 10 10
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of simulations contain in addition a plot of net FDI inﬂows to the domestic
country.
In the benchmark model B0 (see Figure 3), under unequally sized countries,
the convergence of the less developed to the more developed country is charac-
terized by halving the gap between GDP per capita within 15 years, empirical
exchange rate appreciation by 28% by the end of convergence, real exchange
rate depreciation by 8 percent, initial trade balance deﬁcit of 1.5% turning
into surplus of roughly 1% in 15 years, and ﬁnally a temporary debt to GDP
ratio of the size of 8%.
In comparison of the variant B1 to B0 (see Figure 3), the absence of the quality
investments causes a faster closure of the convergence gap; the half of the gap is
reached in roughly 10 years. However, the empirical exchange rate appreciates
very negligibly and similarly the real exchange rate depreciates also only by
5%. Even though the dynamics of the trade balance exhibits similar pattern,
the extremes are 4-5 times greater than in the benchmark model. Also, the
debt to GDP is recorded at the level of 30% (approximately three times the
size of the debt under benchmark model).
The model without self-selection to export, i.e., B2, departs from the bench-
mark model in real exchange rate (see Figure 4), which remains constant, but
due to presence of quality investment the empirical exchange rate appreciates,
albeit a third of the size in the benchmark. In other variables, the B2 vari-
ant is close to the benchmark: trade balance, debt to GDP or convergence
of GDP per capita. Overall, the model B2 (i.e. without export self-selection)
has a similar dynamics to the benchmark model with the exception of the
real exchange rate. The explanation is that tradeness self-selection increases
the ex-ante value of new entrants, since the selection mechanism respects en-
trants’ productivity, and therefore the increase in the number of ﬁrms during
convergence is ceteris paribus higher under the benchmark than under B2.
The model without quality investment and without self-selection to export,
i.e. B3, exhibits very the same dynamics as model B1 (see Figure 3) in trade
balance, debt to GDP, real exchange rate, or convergence ratio of GDP per
capita.
In summary: the models without investment into quality (B1 and B3) exhibits
a faster convergence and their debt-to-GDP ratios and trade balances reach
more extreme values than models with investment to quality (B0 and B2).
In that respect, the models B1 and B3 are more similar to the standard small
open economy models: the expectation of future wealth leads agents to borrow
heavily in the presence (initial large trade balance deﬁcits), which is repaid
later (later trade balances surpluses).
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the models with quality investments. The intuition behind is the following:
in these models consumption today is too expensive not only because of the
future need of debt repayments, but also because of the depreciation of the
welfare theoretical real exchange rate. This channel is stronger for model with
vertical investments. It can be considered as a virtue of these models, given
that international macro models usually introduce consumption habits or some
kind of frictions or adjustment costs to mitigate otherwise signiﬁcative con-
sumption smoothing.
The impact of the size on the macroeconomic dynamics can be seen from
the comparison of the Figures 3 and 4 (unequally sized countries: converging
country is 1/6 of the developed one) against Figures 5 and 6 (equally sized
countries). It follows that under all four models, smaller converging countries
exhibits greater appreciation of the empirical exchange rate (by roughly 10%)
and greater depreciation of the real exchange rate, while the rest of the tra-
jectories remain roughly equal for diﬀerent sizes of the converging country.
This can be expected, since if the two countries are similar then the relative
expansions in both vertical and horizontal investments is lower than if the con-
verging country is smaller. The mechanism behind diﬀerences in consumption
smoothing between models with and without quality investment is present in
both scenarios.
The simulations of the benchmark model under unequally sized countries with
and without cross-border asset ownership are featured on Figure 7. By allowing
for cross-border assets ownership, the convergence of GDP per capita, real
exchange rate depreciation, and debt to GDP ratio remain roughly unchanged,
while larger diﬀerences can be observed in the case of the rest of variables.
For the model dynamics under cross-border assets ownership the productiv-
ity of investment is the crucial aspect. In particular, in the case that the
investment carries productivity of the source country (labeled above as the
AF case), the empirical real exchange rate appreciation is signiﬁcantly greater
than in the case that the productivity of investment is the local one (i.e., that
of converging country - the AH case). Similarly, the net FDI inﬂow in the
former case is positive and large, while in the latter case it is negative. The
intuition is that in the AH case both agents ﬁnd more proﬁtable to invest in
the more advanced countries: beneﬁts of lower wages in the domestic country
do not outweigh costs in terms of lower productivity and a smaller domestic
market 20 . Therefore under the AH case, the ﬁrst years of convergence are
20 The market-size eﬀect is crucial: if we assume that multinational ﬁrms must
export all its production to the origin country, then the AH case would exhibit zero
FDI along the transition, but under the AF case there will be positive FDI inﬂows
in the ﬁrst years of transition and zero FDI after the converging country gets its
productivity close enough to the advanced country.
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ﬁnance their consumption from repatriated proﬁts from the advanced country.
This mechanism is responsible for rest of patterns of the AH case: such econ-
omy initially accumulates a large debt to ﬁnance its investment abroad, the
debt is gradually paid by a part of repatriated proﬁts, and its trade-balance
remain negative through the whole period (the converging economy is a net
investor through the whole period!). Its production is depressed initially (they
invest initially only abroad) and starts to rise later on when its productivity
reaches a certain threshold. This also explains the pattern of the observed
exchange rate and its initial depreciation.
On the other hand, the AF case is closer to the usually-told story of the
converging economy. There is initial net investment inﬂow to the converging
economy and the converging economy exhibits a large trade-balance surplus
since foreign companies are more likely to be exporters (the cut-oﬀ z is lower
for such ﬁrms: They have more funds for investment into quality and thus their
operating proﬁts from the market in the more advanced country is higher) 21 .
The proﬁle of the debt is diﬀerent between the two cases too. In the AH case,
the economy accumulate the debt almost instantaneously, the reason is that
this debt serves as a ﬁnancial source of investments to the advanced country.
The fact that the productivity diﬀerential makes the advanced country rela-
tively more favorable place for investments in the beginning of the transition
implies that the transition country has the biggest incentives to borrow at the
beginning too. On the other hand, in the AF case, the debt proﬁle is stan-
dard one: it serves as the standard consumption smoothing channel mainly
and thus its proﬁle resemble the proﬁle for the economy without cross-asset
ownerships.
21 In a typical CEE country, the trade balance was in deﬁcit during the ﬁrst years of
the transition, and it has started to improve since 2000. Likewise, the beginning of
FDI inﬂows dates around the year 2000, see Figure 1. The logic of the AF model –
on contrary – implies that FDI inﬂows should be most important at the beginning
of the transition and this results in the trade surplus from the beginning. The likely
explanation of the diﬀerence is that during ﬁrst years of the transition, foreign in-
vestors faced signiﬁcant uncertainty about business and legal environment, or feared
possibility of political reversals and thus they started to invest later than predicted
by the AF model. This implies that if Br˚ uha, Podpiera and Pol´ ak (2007) in their
case study wanted to replicate not only the trade balance, but the structure of the
ﬁnancial account as well, they would need to introduce a fall in the adjustment cost
parameter for foreign investment by 2000. The initial high value of the parameter
may represent these initial fears of foreign investors, which were diminished after
they learnt something more about transition countries.
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exchange rate appreciation slightly stronger, the debt to GDP is deeper, and
the net FDI inﬂow is higher compared to the simulation with countries of
unequal size. In other words, the convergence process appears to be faster
and through higher dynamics of the convergence processes. In the AH case,
the diﬀerences are smaller, nevertheless important. Although, the same size of
countries does not imply diﬀerent pattern of GDP per capita convergence nor
empirical real exchange rate and real exchange rate, it however suggests that
the net inﬂow of FDI and the trade balance will be both slightly positive. Also
the debt to GDP ratio will be deeper compared to unequally sized countries.
The reader may notice one issue: for symmetric countries both approaches
yield zero net FDI in the steady state, which is not true when the countries
have diﬀerent sizes. In the latter situation if the countries enjoy the same
TFP, the smaller country will be a net exporter of FDI. This is caused by
the above mentioned home-market eﬀect: it is more proﬁtable to locate in
the larger market; only the quadratic adjustment costs ensure that there are
some entrants in the smaller country; a reader may want to compare this issue
with the footlose capital model with asymmetric countries (cf. chapter 14 and
appendix to chapter 3 in Baldwin et al, 2003). If one wants to cancel out the
home-market eﬀect, one has to calibrate investment costs for f∗ ﬁrms higher
than for d∗ ﬁrms.
5 Macroeconomic implications of trade cost declines
5.1 Motivation and overview of the literature
The eﬀect of declining trade costs is a prominent topic of the New Interna-
tional Macroeconomics. For instance, Baldwin (2005) discusses testable prop-
erties of trade liberalization in the NIM framework, while Baldwin and Forslid
(2000) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2004) explore trade-growth linkage
in a set-up of symmetric countries (in size and development). Bayoumi et al
(2004) simulate removal of trade barriers as an integral feature of the eco-
nomic integration. Although the model by Bayoumi et al (2004) is calibrated
to a transition country, the model does not address some important stylized
facts related to transition countries, such as the pace of the real exchange rate
appreciation.
Therefore, an investigation of the macroeconomic implications of a decline in
trade costs between asymmetric countries in the NIM framework together with
the comparison to other selected models will shed more light into the inquiries
on trade costs eﬀects. Especially, as emphasized by Willenbockel (1999) models
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The simulation with countries of equal size, see Figure 8, suggest that for theabstracting from cross-border asset ownership (as all mentioned above) might
lead to false (inaccurate) predictions. The intuition behind his results is that
when nontrivial cross-border asset ownership is introduced, the otherwise fa-
vorable eﬀect of real exchange rate appreciation on import costs may be either
boosted or dominated by a change in valuation of international proﬁt ﬂows.
Therefore, the cross-border asset ownership may have a non-negligible eﬀect
on macroeconomic implications of trade barriers removals. Although Willen-
bockel (1999) ﬁnds that these eﬀects are potentially important, he imposes
an exogenous structure of cross-border asset ownership, which suﬀers from
obvious limitations.
Since the present model allows for non-trivial cross-border asset ownership,
which arises endogenously in the intertemporal general equilibrium, it can be
used to assess how important are caveats raised by Willenbockel (1999) in
the consistent intertemporal framework under endogenous cross-border asset
ownership. By examining the implications in the model versions, which were
introduced above (Section 4), we expose the model properties from a diﬀerent
perspective.
5.2 Setup of Simulations
A helpful contribution of Baldwin (2005) derives a set of testable predictions
how trade cost removals inﬂuence the proﬁtability of new entry, distribution of
income, consumer welfare and trade patterns. These are important issues, nev-
ertheless we concentrate rather on macroeconomic issues and less on welfare
and income distribution issues.
We explore the eﬀects of trade cost declines on (i) trade balance, (ii) open-
ness, (iii) empirical exchange rate, (iv) asset positions, (v) GDP per capita
convergence, and (vi) GDP levels in both countries.
We run the following set of experiments:
Iceberg costs: we compare implied transition dynamics of economies with
quality investment for the case that initial iceberg costs t are two-times
higher than the benchmark calibration. The experiment considers a fall
after 60 years of transition (i.e. when the transition in productivity levels is
ﬁnished).
Export-eligibility costs: we compare implied transition dynamics of these
economies for the case that the ratio of ce/cn is of 20% higher than in
the benchmark calibration (we ﬁx cn and increase initial ce). Again it is
assumed that ce falls after 60 years of transition. A 20% fall in ce roughly
corresponds to the same steady state change in the eligibility cut-oﬀ zd as
the above introduced fall in t.
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with cross-border asset ownership.
In all the simulated cases, we assume that the change in the trade costs are
correctly anticipated by agents. The productivity growth of the domestic econ-
omy AH
t is calibrated exactly as in the preceding section.
5.3 Results of Simulation
Figure 9 shows the impact of a fall in iceberg costs from 0.1 to 0.05 at 2050.
The simulations are run for three types of models: the benchmark model B0,
the model without non-traded goods B2 and for the model with exogenous non-
traded goods 22 . A number of features – which are conﬁrmed by simulations
– can be predicted:
• under larger iceberg costs, the export-market eﬀect is smaller and thus the
ratio of per capita GDP is initially smaller; it rises after the change. This
is due to the export-market eﬀect, which is more important for the smaller
country as explained in Section 3.
• the smaller country borrows to ﬁnance entry of additional entrants, rela-
tively more entrants enters in the smaller country because of the export-
market eﬀect;
• indeed if the two countries were similar in size, then the real interest rate
would rise, but the trade balance would remain balanced;
• for models with non-traded goods, the empirical exchange rate appreciate;
this eﬀect is more important for the model with endogenous non-tradeness.
The intuition is that more entrants enter under endogenous tradeness, since
the cut-oﬀ z endogenously accommodates (it declines) and the expected
proﬁt from entry rises more than in the case that the tradeness is decided
based on a random mechanism.
A similar impact can have a drop in export eligibility cost ce.This can be
seen from Figure 10, which displays simulation for a 20% decline in ce. The
diﬀerence between the two cases is that the smaller economy accumulates
a lower debt under the latter scenario. This is quite intuitive: a drop in ce
ceteris paribus translates to lower investment requirements and this mitigates
the eﬀect of the increase in investments.
22 This model is calibrated so that the steady state ratio of the numbers of traded
and non-traded goods equal to the steady state number implied by the bench-
mark model. The diﬀerence is that this alternative does not exhibit the export
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border asset ownership. The dynamics is very similar under all three cases.
Thus, we do not conﬁrm Willenbockel (1999) concerns in a model with en-
dogenous and determinate cross-border asset ownerships. This holds also for
a fall in the eligibility cost ce.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced a two-country model that goes in its structure
beyond the existing models in the literature, and as such it allows for consistent
explanation of greater range of key macroeconomic variables of a transition
converging economy.
The major conceptual diﬀerences stem from modeling unequally developed
countries that are potentially distinct in their relative sizes and the introduc-
tion of explicit investment into quality. From the technical point of view, the
diﬀerence in the modeling approach compared to the literature is in using
dynamic simulations for solving the model.
The paper presents an analysis of properties of the proposed model in contrast
to similar models in the literature in the framework of dynamic simulations.
In particular, it explores the conceptual diﬀerences in terms of horizontal
and vertical (explicit quality) investment and export-eligibility investment. In
addition, the analysis of eﬀects of trade costs and cross-border asset ownership
on the model properties is also presented.
As it follows from the results, various models in the literature, that were con-
sidered alternatively to the proposed model, proved to be unsatisfactory for
consistent explanation of stylized facts of macroeconomic dynamics in tran-
sition countries of the Central and Eastern Europe (CCE). In particular, the
scale of real exchange rate appreciation observed in the CEE can be explained
only if one accepts the proposed extension (vertical investment) introduced in
the present model. In addition, allowing for cross-border asset ownership in
the present model helps to motivate the faster speed of real convergence and
greater dynamics in macroeconomic variables observed in the CEE countries
– i.e., the speed-up of the entire convergence process, than would be predicted
by models without this feature.
Consequently, the proposed model in this paper appears as an important ex-
planation and forecasting tool of the convergence process of a transition econ-
omy. For his potential for policy related applications using particular country
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A.1 Model Equation under Particular Functional Forms
In this part of the paper, we derive the main model equation for particu-
lar functional forms of the production function, utility function and invest-
ment cost functions. In particular, as a benchmark calibration, we use the





for production of physical
quantities. This formulation implies the Cobb-Douglas production function
f(k,l) = kαl1−α for the production of the quality-quantity bundle. The mo-
mentary utility function is parameterized using the common constant-relative-
risk-aversion form u(C) = (1−ε)−1C1−ε, with the parameter of intertemporal
substitution ε. As usually, the case of ε = 1 is interpreted as log(C). The
distribution G of idiosyncratic shocks is uniform on the interval [0,1].













First, we derive the optimal investment decision, and the present value of
proﬁt ﬂows for a non-eligible ﬁrm 23 . Such a ﬁrm will supply the following
quantity-quality bundle qd



























































































23 Also, in this part of the paper, we derive expression only for ﬁrms located in the
domestic country and owned by the domestic agent. The expression for other types
of ﬁrms are easily derived then.
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which is obviously positive.
Second, we derive optimal production decisions of eligible ﬁrms is derived.



















































































observe that κjt does not depend on individual characteristics of ﬁrms: zj
and kj; it depends only on relative tightness of both markets and on the real
exchange rate corrected for transport costs t. Therefore, all eligible ﬁrms will
sell the same share of its products to the domestic resp. foreign markets. Thus
henceforth we will simply write κt for κjt. Deﬁne

















































































































































































Now, we are able to derive the expected present value of proﬁt stream. We
start with an eligible ﬁrm Pde
































while the expected present value Pdn
































The value of an eligible ﬁrm located in the domestic country and owned by
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and similarly for a non-eligible ﬁrm
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Similarly, the value of a non-eligible ﬁrm is
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. (A.1)
Value functions V dn
τ (zj), V de
τ (zj) implicitly deﬁne the cut-oﬀ value z, which is
the least idiosyncratic shock, which makes the the export-eligibility investment







τ (zj) ≥ V
dn
τ (zj)).
Also for the chosen parametrization of the production function, one can derive
the labor demand. The formula is complicated and is given in the next section,
since it involves integration over labor demands of ﬁrms of various vintages,
see (A.8), (A.9) and (A.10) below.
A.2 Model in the First-order Form
In this part of the paper, we transform the model into the ﬁrst-order form,
which is suitable for numerical evaluation. We do it for parametrization used
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Expected value of the stream of future proﬁts (from the unit investment now)
Ω◦
t are given as the sum of weighted expected values from eligible and non-
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t , (with xi ∈ {d,f}) and where:
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where deﬁnitions of expectations of proﬁts Πxxx
t and cut-oﬀ values will be
given in the next subsubsection.
To get equations for actual realized proﬁts Ξ
x1x2
t , xi ∈ {d,f}, we have to split






t . The ﬁrst-order
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where the numbers of eligible / non-eligible ﬁrms distinguished by location
and ownerships (i.e. n
ξx1x2
t , ξ ∈ {e,n}, xi ∈ {d,f}) is given in the next sub-
subsection.












t is the export of ﬁrms located in the domestic country and owned







t ). We have the convention that exports are denominated in the currency
of the original market (thus Xdd
t , X
fd
t are in the domestic currency), cf. Eq.
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A similar recursive equation holds for non-eligible ﬁrms:
b n
nx1x2
















These recursive schemes are used in the next subsubsection too (when deriving
the labor demand).
The rest of model dynamic equations are balance-of-payment equation (29),
households’ budget constraints (10), (20), households’ Euler equations (14),
(21) and households’ equations, which determines the asset holdings: (18),
(19), (22), (23). These last 4 equations are not in the ﬁrst-order form, but we





































n + (1 − G(z
x1x2
t ))c
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The model has static equations too. These are mainly market clearing condi-
tions and deﬁnitions. The market clearing conditions include the clearing of
the goods markets (25), (26), international bond market clearing (28) and la-
bor market clearing conditions. We now show how the labor market conditions



















































































































































































The labor demands should be equal to inelastic labor supply.
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This part of the appendix discusses numerical methods used to simulate
the model. Basically, we have experimented with two classes of methods:
(i) projection-based methods and (ii) domain-truncation (such as L-B-J ap-
proach) methods.
Before discussing these methods, it is worth to realize a fact, which we use
when applying both methods: If one can guess the time proﬁle of the following
six variables: domestic output {Qt}
∞















and the real exchange rate {ηt}
∞
t=0, one can easily compute the time proﬁle of
all other endogenous variables (given exogenous and policy variables). Indeed,
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t}
∞









to compute expected investment costs {e c◦
t}
∞
t=0 and ﬁrst-order conditions
(A.6) to compute the numbers of new entrants.




t=0 and (A.8), (A.9) and (A.10) to ﬁnd labor demand in both
countries.
(5) One can use households’ Euler equations to derive the optimal bond
holding and from the international-bond market clearing condition to
derive the interest rate {rt}
∞
t=0;
Now, the idea is clear: to guess the time proﬁle and verify the guess. The guess
should be veriﬁed as follows:
(1) Budget constraints for both households have to be satisﬁed: (10), (20).
(2) Labor markets in both countries have to be cleared: (27) and similarly
for the foreign country.
(3) The balance of payment condition has to be satisﬁed: (29).
(4) Goods markets have to be cleared as well: (25), (26).





























t=0, where we interpret ~t(
− →
H0) =
0 as the fulﬁlment of these conditions at time t for a guess
− →
H0. Note that the
fulﬁllment of equilibrium condition at time t, ~t = 0 does not depend on the
value of the seven variables at time t only: it depends on their whole time
proﬁles. It depends on future values because of expectations of proﬁts, e..g to-
days’ investment decisions depend on future streams of proﬁts, cf. (7), (8), and
the it depends on past values because of predetermined variables in budget
constraints.
In any case, the equilibrium candidate
− →
H is an inﬁnite-dimensional object and
for practical simulations, we have to approximate it by a ﬁnite-dimensional
representation. The projection and L-B-J -based methods do that in diﬀerent
ways.
The strategy of the projection method is following: approximate the time
proﬁles using a object parameterized by a low number of parameters (such as
24 The circle ◦ in the superscript henceforth stands for any of these superscripts edd,
ndd, nfd, efd, eff, nff, ndf, edf.
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− →
H ≈ f H(f),
where f is a ﬁnite vector of parameters. Then the problem is to ﬁnd such a
vector of parameters
− →
f, such that the equilibrium conditions ~t(f H(
− →
f)) = 0
nearly holds for all t. Judd (2002) discusses applications of the projection
methods in the context of perfect foresight discrete-time models.
Another approach (called domain truncation approach) to reduce dimension-
ality of
− →
H is to set {Qt}
∞
t=0 ≈ b Q = {Q1,...,QN,Q+,Q+,...,Q+}, where Q+ is




b Q, c W, b C, c Q∗, d W∗, c C∗, b η
o
,
and solve the system
~1(c H) = 0 (A.12)
~2(c H) = 0
. . .
~M(c H) = 0
for M  N. This is a system of 7M unknowns. Lafargue (1990) proposed
this approach, and Boucekkine (1995) and Juillard et al. (1998) exploited the
sparseness of the system to apply an eﬃcient algorithm. Hence, the approach
uses to be called as L-B-J approach (see also Gilli and Pauletto 1998 or Arm-
strong et al. 1998 for further discussions about eﬃcient implementation). The
stacked system (A.12) is usually solved using Newton-based iterations. When
applied to the model presented in this paper, we cannot use eﬃcient algo-
rithms for sparse systems unless δ = 1. The case of δ = 1 is the only case,
when the Jacobian of (A.12) is sparse.
We experimented with both approaches: as projections we chose splines and
RBC neural networks. To solve the system (A.12), we apply the quasi-Newton
iteration, with the Hessian update via the BFGS method suggested by Broyden
(1970), Fletcher (1970), Goldfarb (1970), and Shanno (1970). Our numerical
experiments seems to suggest that for our problem the BFGS formula out-
performs the Hessian update formula of Davidson (1959) and Fletcher and
Powell (1963) and the steepest-descent approach 25 . Likewise, numerical ex-
periments suggest that quasi-Newton iterations outperform the Nelder-Mead
simplex algorithm by Lagarias et al. (1998) implemented in MATLAB function
fminsearch.
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August 2007Surprisingly, the L-B-J approach seems to perform better than the projection
methods. We plan to investigate why this is so in future. Therefore, simulation
results reported in this paper are based on quasi-Newton iterations on (A.12)
with the BFGS Hessian update formula.
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Table 2. The Best






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 791
August 2007 
 












































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 791
August 2007 
 
Figure 2. Investment to quality as a func
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Figure 10. A fall in export-
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